Turkey’s oil industry is defined by a basic imbalance. The country has a large population, substantial transport demand, a major industrial economy, and one of the strongest refining systems in its region, but it still produces only a minority of the crude oil it consumes.
This makes oil security an important economic and strategic issue. At the same time, Turkey’s position between the Caspian region, Russia, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and European markets gives it an influence that cannot be measured through domestic production alone.
Recent discoveries and higher output from southeastern Turkey have improved the national supply picture. However, the wider oil economy continues to depend on imported crude, large refineries, marine terminals, and pipelines crossing the country. Turkey is therefore both a major consumer trying to reduce its import bill and a regional processing and transit center.
Gabar Has Changed Turkey’s Domestic Production Story
For many years, Turkish crude oil production was concentrated in mature fields around Batman, Adıyaman, and Diyarbakır in the southeast. Output remained modest compared with national demand, while many fields required continued drilling, rehabilitation, and enhanced recovery work.
The development of the Gabar area in Şırnak Province has given the upstream sector a new center of growth. Turkey produced 47.9 million barrels of domestic oil in 2025, up from 38 million barrels in 2024. Daily output reached a record of more than 135,000 barrels during the year.
By late 2025, the Gabar fields alone were producing about 81,000 barrels per day. This made the area responsible for a large share of national production and changed expectations for Turkey’s domestic oil industry.
The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation, commonly known as TPAO, remains central to exploration and development. Drilling is also continuing in established southeastern provinces and in less-developed onshore and offshore areas.
Higher domestic production reduces foreign-currency costs, supports employment and infrastructure in southeastern Turkey, and provides more feedstock for domestic refineries. Nevertheless, it does not remove the country’s reliance on imports. Gabar is important because it reduces the supply deficit, not because it makes Turkey self-sufficient.
Future production growth will depend on whether output from Gabar can be maintained as development expands and whether exploration produces another commercially significant discovery.
Refining Gives Turkey More Weight Than Its Oil Reserves
Turkey’s refining industry is considerably larger and more important than its upstream sector. Tüpraş operates the İzmit, İzmir, Kırıkkale, and Batman refineries, with combined annual refining capacity of approximately 30 million tonnes.
SOCAR’s STAR Refinery at Aliağa adds another 13 million tonnes of crude-processing capacity. Together, the facilities allow Turkey to process domestic and imported crude into diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, liquefied petroleum gas, bitumen, and other industrial products.
The geography of the refining system reflects the structure of the economy. The large İzmit and İzmir facilities are close to ports, industrial centers, and dense consumer markets in western Turkey. Kırıkkale supports central regions, while Batman is more closely connected to southeastern production.
STAR Refinery is integrated with the Petkim petrochemical complex. This creates a wider industrial chain in which imported crude can support fuel production, petrochemicals, logistics, storage, and exports.
Refining also changes the nature of Turkey’s dependence. The country does not rely entirely on imported finished fuels. It imports crude oil, processes it domestically, and retains part of the value through refinery operations, employment, distribution, and product sales.
Turkey imported almost 32 million tonnes of oil in 2025, showing the scale of the feedstock requirement even after domestic production increased. The country can export selected petroleum products while remaining a major net importer of crude.
Crude Supply Has Become a Diversification Question
Russia became Turkey’s dominant crude supplier after 2022 as discounted Russian barrels were redirected away from several European markets. Turkish refineries were commercially and technically well placed to use medium and heavier sour grades, including Russian Urals crude.
The concentration also created risks. Sanctions on Russian producers, tankers, and trading networks complicated purchasing decisions. European restrictions affecting fuels made from Russian oil also reduced the attractiveness of using Russian feedstock for products intended for some export markets.
During 2025, Turkish refiners increased purchases from Iraq and Kazakhstan and added or tested supplies from producers including Libya and Norway. This represented a move toward greater flexibility rather than a complete withdrawal from Russian crude.
Iraq remains a natural supplier because of its proximity and existing pipeline connections. Kazakhstan can reach Turkey through Black Sea shipping or through Caspian and Caucasus routes. Mediterranean and Middle Eastern producers provide additional options.
The main oil-security issue is therefore not only how much crude Turkey imports. It is whether those supplies are diverse, competitively priced, legally secure, and suitable for the country’s refinery system.
A refinery network operating at high capacity needs reliable access to the correct crude grades. Excessive exposure to one producer, shipping route, or sanctions regime can create commercial disruption even when global oil supplies remain available.
Ceyhan Connects Caspian and Iraqi Oil to the Mediterranean
Turkey’s most important role in regional oil trade is centered on Ceyhan, on the Mediterranean coast. Two major international pipeline systems terminate there: the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan system from Iraq.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline has operated since 2006 and can transport more than one million barrels per day. It primarily moves Azerbaijani crude from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Turkey, while also offering an alternative outlet for some Kazakh oil.
By the end of 2025, the system had transported approximately 4.7 billion barrels. Operational control was scheduled to pass from BP to Azerbaijan’s SOCAR in July 2026, while the pipeline’s international ownership structure remained in place.
The Iraqi route has been much less stable. The Kirkuk–Ceyhan system has nominal capacity close to 1.5 million barrels per day, but conflict, physical damage, political disagreements, payment disputes, and arbitration have kept actual flows far below that level.
Exports returned after a long interruption, but shipments from Kirkuk averaged only about 177,000 barrels per day in April 2026. As of June 2026, Turkey and Iraq were negotiating a new framework to replace the existing pipeline agreement, which was due to expire in July.
These systems confirm Turkey’s value as an energy corridor, but they also demonstrate that infrastructure alone does not guarantee trade. Pipelines require security, functioning commercial agreements, reliable supply, acceptable oil quality, and stable relations between governments and producers.
Underused capacity at Ceyhan is both a weakness and a possible source of future growth. Greater Iraqi flows, additional Kazakh shipments, or new Caspian production could increase Turkey’s importance as a Mediterranean export outlet.
Oil Will Remain Important During Turkey’s Energy Transition
Turkey is expanding renewable electricity, electric vehicles, energy efficiency, and lower-carbon industrial technologies. Tüpraş and SOCAR are also investing in areas such as renewable power, sustainable aviation fuel, and green hydrogen.
These changes will gradually affect petroleum demand, particularly in passenger transport. Oil will nevertheless remain important for freight, aviation, petrochemicals, agriculture, construction, shipping, and the existing vehicle fleet.
The likely development path is therefore mixed. Domestic output may continue rising from Gabar and other discoveries, while imported crude will remain necessary. Refineries will need to diversify feedstock, control costs, and produce fuels that meet changing environmental and market requirements.
Turkey is unlikely to become a major crude exporter through domestic production. Its more realistic advantage lies in combining selective upstream growth with large-scale refining, storage, distribution, marine terminals, and international pipelines.
The country’s influence in oil markets will continue to come less from the size of its reserves than from the volume of crude it can process, transport, and deliver to regional consumers.
