Poland has discussed nuclear electricity for several decades, but the country has never operated a commercial nuclear power reactor. That distinction is now becoming increasingly important. Nuclear power has moved from a long-term policy ambition into a major national construction programme supported by a selected site, reactor technology, state financing and an international delivery partnership.
The programme is closely connected to the transformation of Poland’s electricity system. Coal remains an important source of power, but many coal-fired units are aging and face growing economic and environmental pressure. Wind and solar capacity are expanding, yet Poland also needs dependable generation that can operate when weather conditions limit renewable output. Nuclear power is intended to fill part of the gap created as coal plants retire while helping the country avoid excessive dependence on imported natural gas.
The First Polish Nuclear Power Plant Takes Shape on the Baltic Coast
Poland’s first commercial nuclear power plant is planned for the Lubiatowo-Kopalino area in the Choczewo municipality of Pomerania. The location lies near the Baltic Sea, west of the coastal city of Gdańsk. Access to cooling water, available land and connections to the national transmission system helped make the site suitable for a project of this scale.
The plant will use Westinghouse AP1000 pressurized water reactor technology. Westinghouse is working with engineering and construction company Bechtel, while the state-owned Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe, commonly known as PEJ, is responsible for developing the project on the Polish side. The completed station is expected to provide up to approximately 3.75 GW of generating capacity.
Preparatory work includes detailed engineering, geological surveys, licensing documentation and development of supporting infrastructure. The wider project will require new roads, transmission connections, water systems, construction facilities and accommodation for a large temporary workforce. These associated investments are significant because Poland is creating a commercial nuclear sector rather than simply adding another reactor to an established fleet.
The current government schedule calls for construction to begin in 2028. Completion of the first unit and the following testing and regulatory stages are intended to support commercial operation in 2036. Later units would follow as the site develops into a multi-reactor power station.
This schedule represents a change from earlier plans that proposed an earlier start date. Nuclear construction programmes frequently move as designs, financing structures and permits become more detailed. For Poland, maintaining progress through the engineering and licensing phases will be more important than preserving targets that no longer reflect the project’s actual position.
Nuclear Power Is Designed to Replace Firm Coal Generation
The case for nuclear energy in Poland is not based only on emissions reduction. It is also a question of power-system structure.
Coal-fired stations have historically supplied electricity that could be dispatched according to demand. As these plants close, Poland must replace both their annual generation and their ability to provide electricity during periods of high consumption. Solar and wind farms can supply large volumes of low-carbon power, but their production changes with sunlight and wind conditions.
Nuclear plants could operate alongside renewables as a source of continuous low-carbon generation. This does not remove the need for energy storage, flexible gas plants, demand management or stronger cross-border connections. It does, however, give Poland another large domestic source of dependable electricity.
The fuel requirements of a nuclear plant are also relatively small compared with the constant fuel deliveries needed by a coal or gas station. Nuclear fuel can be purchased from international suppliers and stored in advance, reducing exposure to short-term commodity disruptions. Energy security has become particularly important in Poland following Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
The first plant is therefore expected to serve several purposes at once. It would replace part of the electricity generated by retiring coal assets, reduce power-sector emissions, support industrial demand and limit the need to build a future electricity system around imported gas.
Financing Has Become the Programme’s Decisive Test
The technical design of a nuclear power plant is only one part of its development. Financing determines whether the project can proceed through a long construction period before it begins producing revenue.
The Polish government has allocated PLN 60.2 billion in state capital for the first plant. The wider support structure also includes state backing for project debt and a contract-for-difference mechanism intended to provide long-term revenue stability once the station begins operating. Under this type of arrangement, the plant receives additional revenue when market electricity prices fall below an agreed level and returns money when prices rise above it.
European Commission approval of the state-aid package in December 2025 removed a major financial and regulatory obstacle. It gave Poland a framework for supporting the project while remaining within European Union competition rules.
The total cost will be much greater than the state equity contribution. Large nuclear projects require major borrowing, and financing expenses can become a substantial part of the final electricity cost. Delays during construction would raise those expenses further. Poland must therefore control the relationship among PEJ, Westinghouse, Bechtel, lenders, regulators and government agencies.
The country must also develop a domestic nuclear supply chain without overstating how much work Polish companies can perform during the first project. Local manufacturers and construction businesses may supply concrete, steel structures, electrical systems, transport, maintenance and professional services. Highly specialized reactor components will continue to come from experienced international nuclear suppliers.
A realistic localization strategy can build Polish capability while protecting quality and safety. Attempts to force domestic participation into areas where companies lack nuclear certification could increase cost and project risk.
Poland Is Building Nuclear Institutions as Well as Reactors
The National Atomic Energy Agency, or PAA, is preparing to license and supervise a type of facility that has never operated commercially in Poland. This requires additional staff, technical expertise, regulatory procedures and access to independent specialist support.
Poland is not starting without nuclear knowledge. The MARIA research reactor at Świerk has operated since the 1970s and supports scientific research, material testing and radioisotope production. Universities, research institutes and industrial companies also provide a foundation of engineering and radiation-protection expertise.
A commercial programme is nevertheless much larger. Poland will need reactor operators, maintenance teams, safety specialists, inspectors, emergency planners, waste-management professionals and thousands of qualified construction workers. Training must begin years before the first unit enters operation.
Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel will also require permanent national arrangements. Used fuel can initially be stored at the plant, but Poland must create institutions and funding systems that remain effective throughout reactor operation and eventual decommissioning.
A Second Large Plant and SMRs Could Follow
The national programme envisages two large nuclear power plants with combined capacity of approximately 6–9 GW. The first Baltic coast project is much further advanced, while the location, technology, financing and delivery model for a second plant remain less settled.
A second station could extend nuclear generation into another part of the country and support the replacement of additional coal capacity. Candidate locations with existing power infrastructure may offer advantages, but each site would still require extensive environmental, technical and public review.
Polish industrial groups are also exploring small modular reactors. ORLEN Synthos Green Energy has advanced proposals based on GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 design at several potential locations, including industrial and former coal-generation sites. Other Polish companies have examined different reactor technologies for electricity, industrial heat and hydrogen production.
These projects should be separated from the more advanced state programme. Decisions in principle, environmental studies and regulatory discussions allow development work to continue, but they do not mean that reactors have received construction licences or secured complete financing.
SMRs may eventually serve chemical plants, district-heating systems and industrial regions that cannot use the full output of a large nuclear station. Their Polish deployment will depend heavily on successful licensing and construction of reference units in other countries. Until commercial costs and delivery schedules are demonstrated, SMRs remain a possible second branch of the programme rather than a guaranteed source of near-term generation.
Poland’s Nuclear Programme Has Entered Its Delivery Phase
Poland has passed several thresholds that previously kept nuclear power in the planning stage. The first site has been selected, the main technology and construction partners are in place, state financing has been approved, and regulatory preparations are advancing.
The remaining work is more difficult. Poland must complete the design, obtain licences, arrange debt financing, prepare the site, expand the grid and manage a complex international construction programme. It must do so while continuing to operate and transform the rest of its electricity system.
Nuclear power will not solve every part of Poland’s energy transition, and it will arrive too late to replace coal units closing during the 2020s. Its intended role is longer term: providing a large source of low-carbon, dispatchable electricity from the second half of the 2030s. Whether that role becomes reality will depend on disciplined delivery of the Pomeranian project rather than further expansion of the country’s list of nuclear proposals.
