Germany’s natural gas sector has been transformed by the loss of its former supply relationship with Russia. Before 2022, the country relied heavily on relatively inexpensive pipeline gas arriving from the east. Natural gas supported industrial production, building heat, electricity generation, and Germany’s role as a trading center within the European gas market.
That system no longer exists. Germany has replaced it with a more diversified but generally more expensive structure based on Norwegian gas, pipeline deliveries through neighboring countries, direct LNG imports, and large underground storage facilities. Supply security has improved, but the long-term role of gas remains unsettled. Germany is simultaneously maintaining natural gas infrastructure, considering new gas-fired power capacity, reducing fossil-fuel heating, and preparing major parts of its pipeline system for hydrogen.
Germany Rebuilt Its Gas Supply Map After the Russian Cutoff
Germany produces only a small amount of natural gas domestically. Production is concentrated mainly in Lower Saxony, where mature fields continue to operate, but domestic output covers only a limited share of national demand. In 2025, German production sites supplied approximately 34 terawatt-hours of gas, compared with total national consumption of 864 terawatt-hours.
Imports therefore determine the structure of the German market. Norway supplied 44% of German gas imports in 2025, making it the country’s most important direct source. The Netherlands accounted for 24%, while Belgium supplied 21%. Gas entering from the Netherlands and Belgium can include volumes originating from North Sea producers and LNG terminals elsewhere in northwestern Europe.
This supply pattern is more diversified than the former system centered on Russia, but Germany remains exposed to international gas prices. Norwegian pipeline production is important but cannot expand without limit, while LNG prices are influenced by demand in Europe, Asia, and other importing regions. Germany must compete for flexible cargoes during periods of high consumption or restricted global supply.
The country has also become more important as a transit route. German gas exports increased to 221 terawatt-hours in 2025, with Austria, Czechia, and Switzerland receiving the largest volumes. The end of Russian transit through Ukraine increased the importance of alternative supply routes into Central and southeastern Europe. Germany’s pipelines, storage sites, and LNG connections now support neighboring markets as well as domestic consumers.
LNG Terminals Created a New Entry Point for Global Gas
Germany entered the 2022 energy crisis without a domestic LNG import terminal. It had access to LNG through neighboring countries, but imported gas had to enter through international pipeline connections. The government responded by accelerating the development of floating storage and regasification units, which can receive LNG, convert it back into gas, and inject it into the national transmission system.
Terminals began operating at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel, and Lubmin, followed by facilities associated with Mukran on the island of Rügen. Together, the operating terminals imported 106 terawatt-hours of natural gas in 2025, equal to 10.3% of total German imports. That was an increase from 69 terawatt-hours and 8% of imports in 2024.
Direct LNG imports do not replace Germany’s pipeline network. Regasified LNG must still move from coastal terminals to industrial centers, cities, power stations, and storage facilities. New connections and compressor capacity have therefore been needed to move gas away from the northern coast and into the wider system.
The terminals also provide negotiating value even when they operate below maximum capacity. Germany is no longer completely dependent on gas entering through neighboring pipeline systems. Buyers can source LNG from the United States, Qatar, and other exporters, while terminal capacity provides an emergency option during interruptions elsewhere.
This security comes at a cost. Floating terminals require charter payments, port infrastructure, pipeline connections, and operating support. LNG also involves liquefaction, shipping, and regasification expenses that do not apply in the same way to direct pipeline supplies. Germany must therefore balance the security value of excess capacity against the risk of maintaining infrastructure that could be used less often as fossil-gas demand declines.
Storage Has Become Part of Germany’s Security Strategy
Germany possesses extensive underground gas storage capacity, including salt caverns and depleted reservoir sites. These facilities allow gas to be injected during periods of lower demand and withdrawn during the winter heating season. Storage cannot replace continuous imports, but it gives the country time to respond to cold weather, infrastructure failures, or market disruption.
The Rehden facility in Lower Saxony is particularly significant because of its size and its former connection to Russian-owned Gazprom. Its low filling level before the 2022 crisis demonstrated that storage ownership and operating behavior could affect national security. Germany subsequently strengthened government authority over storage and introduced mandatory filling requirements.
The current system applies different targets according to storage type and location. Standard facilities are generally expected to reach 80% before the winter withdrawal season, while a group of specified pore-storage sites has a lower target of 45%. Collectively, the rules are designed to maintain sufficient reserves without requiring every site to follow the same commercial pattern.
Storage policy also affects gas prices. Requiring large injections during summer can increase demand when inventories are low, especially if several European countries are rebuilding storage at the same time. Germany must therefore coordinate security requirements with market conditions and the availability of LNG and pipeline gas.
Industrial Demand Keeps Natural Gas Economically Important
German gas consumption in 2025 was 2.2% higher than in 2024, although it remained approximately 13.5% below the 2018–2021 average. Industry accounted for 60% of total consumption, while households and commercial users accounted for the remaining 40%.
The industrial share explains why Germany cannot treat natural gas only as a heating or electricity issue. Gas is used to produce heat and steam in chemicals, glass, ceramics, food processing, metals, paper, and other manufacturing industries. It is also a raw material in the chemical sector, particularly for hydrogen, ammonia, and fertilizer production.
Large industrial consumers were among the sectors most affected by the gas-price shock that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some facilities reduced production because European gas prices made their output less competitive against products manufactured in regions with cheaper energy. Lower industrial gas use may reduce emissions, but it can also reflect lost production rather than successful technological conversion.
Electrification can replace some industrial gas demand, especially for lower-temperature processes. Other applications may require hydrogen, biomethane, carbon capture, or redesigned production systems. These changes require new equipment, reliable electricity networks, and long-term confidence in future energy prices. Until those alternatives become commercially available at scale, natural gas will remain important to Germany’s industrial base.
Heating and Power Give Gas Two Different Transition Paths
Natural gas has traditionally been a major heating fuel in German homes and commercial buildings. This part of demand is expected to decline as heat pumps, district heating, building renovation, and renewable heat become more common. Carbon pricing also increases the cost of using fossil gas, making long-lived investment in new gas heating systems less attractive.
The electricity sector presents a different problem. Gas-fired plants can respond quickly when wind and solar generation fall, making them useful for balancing a power system with a growing share of variable renewables. Germany is also withdrawing from coal generation, which increases the need for dispatchable capacity, storage, interconnection, and demand management.
New gas-fired plants may therefore be built even while total fossil-gas demand is expected to fall. The intended solution is to make new plants capable of converting to hydrogen. This would allow them to provide flexible generation without remaining dependent on fossil methane throughout their operating lives.
The commercial difficulty is timing. Investors need to know when hydrogen will be available, what it will cost, and whether sufficient pipeline and storage infrastructure will exist. Building plants before the hydrogen market is ready could extend natural gas use. Waiting too long could leave the electricity system without enough dependable capacity during the coal transition.
Germany’s Gas Grid Is Gradually Becoming a Hydrogen Asset
Germany’s existing gas network is one of the country’s most valuable energy assets. Rather than abandon the entire system, policymakers and network operators plan to convert selected pipelines to hydrogen.
The approved hydrogen core network covers approximately 9,040 kilometers and is expected to require €18.9 billion in investment. More than half of the network is planned to come from converted natural gas pipelines, with the remainder constructed as new hydrogen infrastructure. The system is intended to connect industrial centers, import locations, storage sites, power plants, and domestic hydrogen production.
Conversion will not be possible everywhere. Some pipelines must continue carrying natural gas during the transition, while others may not be located near future hydrogen demand. Distribution networks serving residential heating could also lose customers as buildings electrify, creating difficult questions about who pays for systems with declining throughput.
Germany’s natural gas sector is therefore moving in two directions at once. It remains essential to industrial production, winter heat, flexible electricity generation, and regional energy trade. At the same time, its infrastructure is being evaluated for conversion, consolidation, or eventual retirement. The success of this transition will depend on whether Germany can maintain reliable gas supplies in the near term without creating infrastructure and investment commitments that delay the move toward a lower-carbon energy system.
