Sudan’s oil industry has been transformed from a source of national growth into a vulnerable network of damaged fields, contested processing sites and strategic pipelines. The country still produces crude oil and provides the only established export route for most South Sudanese production, but war has weakened almost every part of the system.
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has reduced domestic output, damaged the country’s largest refinery, interrupted pipeline operations and exposed fuel depots and export infrastructure to attack.
Sudan’s present oil importance therefore comes from two connected roles. It is a modest producer with fields concentrated in the south and west, and it is a transit country carrying South Sudanese crude to the Red Sea. Both roles depend on infrastructure crossing areas affected by military competition.
South Sudan’s Independence Reshaped the Petroleum Economy
Sudan became an oil exporter in the late 1990s after production began in the Muglad Basin and the Greater Nile pipeline connected southern oilfields to the Red Sea. Petroleum exports created a major new source of government revenue and foreign currency.
The structure of the industry changed in 2011 when South Sudan became independent. Most producing fields became part of the new country, while the principal pipelines, refineries, storage terminals and Red Sea export facilities remained in Sudan.
The separation created a permanent interdependence. Landlocked South Sudan needed Sudanese pipelines and ports to reach international markets. Sudan lost much of its direct production but gained revenue from pipeline tariffs, processing services and crude-related financial agreements.
Sudan retained several producing areas, particularly around Heglig and Bamboo in West Kordofan and Block 6 in the Muglad Basin. These fields are smaller and more mature than the resources transferred to South Sudan. Production had already been affected by aging reservoirs, limited investment, political instability and the departure of some foreign partners before the present war began.
The two countries collectively held an estimated five billion barrels of proved crude reserves at the beginning of 2024. However, reserve figures do not represent immediately available production. Fields require water injection, maintenance, power, spare parts, skilled workers and secure pipelines. These conditions have become increasingly difficult to maintain.
War Has Cut Production and Disrupted Field Operations
Sudan’s domestic oil production was already far below the levels reached before South Sudanese independence. The fighting that began in 2023 caused a further decline by disrupting staffing, equipment supply, electricity and access to producing regions.
By May 2025, Sudanese officials placed national production at approximately 24,000 barrels per day, less than half its earlier level. The remaining output was concentrated around a limited number of producing areas, making the national system highly exposed to disruptions at individual fields and processing centres.
Heglig is particularly important. The field lies near the South Sudanese border and contains production wells as well as the main processing facilities used by crude arriving from South Sudan’s Unity region. It is therefore both a Sudanese producing asset and a central part of South Sudan’s export system.
The Rapid Support Forces took control of Heglig in December 2025 after Sudanese government forces and oil workers withdrew to avoid fighting inside the facilities. South Sudan subsequently deployed troops to guard the site under an arrangement involving its government, the Sudanese army and the RSF.
Some crude continued to move through Heglig after the change in control, although at reduced volumes. The arrangement demonstrated the unusual political position of the field. South Sudan needs continued production and pipeline access, while both Sudanese sides have an economic interest in preventing the complete destruction of an asset that generates scarce foreign currency.
Military control does not by itself restore reliable production. Oil operations require experienced personnel, chemicals, pumps, power generation, maintenance equipment and continuous monitoring. Even when facilities are not directly destroyed, the inability to move workers and materials can force operators to reduce output.
Pipelines to Port Sudan Are the Sector’s Most Valuable Assets
Sudan has two main pipeline systems connecting oil-producing regions with the Red Sea. The Greater Nile pipeline carries crude from the Unity and Heglig areas northward through Sudan. The Petrodar system transports Dar Blend crude from South Sudan’s Upper Nile region toward the coast.
Both systems terminate near Port Sudan at the Bashayer marine terminals. The coastal complex includes export berths and crude-storage facilities that allow oil to be loaded onto international tankers.
These pipelines are essential to South Sudan because there is no operational alternative export route. Proposals for pipelines through Kenya, Ethiopia or Djibouti have been discussed for years, but their cost, distance and political complexity have prevented them from replacing the Sudan route.
Sudan benefits from transit and processing payments when South Sudanese oil flows through its territory. This income has become even more important as Sudan’s own production has fallen and the wider economy has contracted during the war.
The system is also technically difficult to operate. Dar Blend and some other regional crudes contain significant wax and must remain heated or continue moving through the pipeline. A long shutdown can allow the oil to solidify, making a restart much more complicated than simply reopening a valve.
This became a major problem in February 2024 when the Petrodar route stopped operating after damage and operational failures connected to the fighting. Sudan declared force majeure in March. Engineers later had to repair the system and clear wax deposits before exports could resume.
Sudan lifted the force majeure in January 2025, permitting South Sudanese production to restart. Further drone attacks and field disruptions during 2025 temporarily stopped or reduced flows again. The repeated interruptions showed that the pipeline can be repaired, but it cannot operate normally without security across a route extending for more than a thousand kilometres.
Port Sudan had initially been seen as safer than Khartoum and western producing regions. That assumption weakened when drone attacks reached fuel depots, power infrastructure and the airport area in the Red Sea city during 2025. The expansion of attacks toward the coast increased the risk to Sudan’s final functioning trade corridor.
The Destruction of Al-Jaili Ended Domestic Refining
The Al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum was the centre of Sudan’s fuel-processing system. Often called the Khartoum refinery, it had been developed with Chinese participation and was designed to process domestic crude into gasoline, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas and other products.
Its location placed it close to the main pipeline corridor and Sudan’s largest urban market. However, it also placed the facility directly inside one of the war’s most heavily contested areas.
The refinery changed hands during the conflict and suffered repeated damage. Major fires broke out in January 2025 as the Sudanese army and RSF accused each other of attacking the complex. Later assessments described extensive destruction to processing units, storage tanks and supporting infrastructure.
Sudan’s oil minister estimated the damage at approximately $3 billion and said national refining operations had ceased. Without the refinery, Sudan was forced into the commercially inefficient position of exporting its limited crude production while importing gasoline, diesel and other finished fuels.
Fuel imports create pressure on foreign-currency reserves and expose consumers to transport costs, exchange-rate movements and supply shortages. Distribution has also been affected by damaged roads, bridges, power systems and storage depots.
Rebuilding Al-Jaili would involve more than repairing visible fire damage. Processing units would require detailed inspection, specialised replacement equipment and reliable utilities. The surrounding pipeline, power, water and transport systems would also need to be restored.
A smaller refinery or modular processing units near Port Sudan could reduce dependence on the Khartoum area, but such projects would require financing and a level of security that remains difficult to guarantee.
Oil Revenue Now Depends on Cooperation Across Front Lines
Sudan’s oil system cannot recover through new exploration alone. The immediate priorities are protecting existing fields, maintaining cross-border pipelines, restoring processing facilities and ensuring that Port Sudan remains available for exports and fuel imports.
The country may still have unexplored petroleum potential in the Muglad, Melut and Red Sea basins. Under peaceful conditions, these resources could attract interest from Chinese, Gulf, African or other international investors. Under present conditions, geological opportunity is outweighed by physical and political risk.
Operators face uncertainty over contracts, payment, field access, military control and the ability to remove production from the country. Insurance and financing costs are also likely to remain high while infrastructure can be attacked or occupied.
The most valuable near-term outcome would be a stable agreement protecting Heglig, the Greater Nile pipeline, the Petrodar system and the Bashayer terminals. Such an arrangement would support South Sudanese exports, generate transit income for Sudan and create a foundation for eventual reconstruction.
The industry’s future is therefore inseparable from the wider conflict. Sudan still possesses oilfields, pipelines and a strategic Red Sea outlet, but its production and refining capacity cannot recover while those assets remain divided among military forces or exposed to repeated attack. Restoring the oil sector will require security across the full chain from the producing fields to the export terminal, followed by major investment in refinery and pipeline reconstruction.