Russia’s nuclear industry is larger than its contribution to the national electricity mix alone suggests. Nuclear plants provide roughly one-fifth of Russian electricity, but the sector also supports reactor design, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, research, naval propulsion and major construction projects abroad. This gives nuclear energy an industrial and strategic role extending far beyond power generation.
As of June 2026, Russia had 34 operating power reactors with almost 28 GW of net capacity. Five additional reactors, representing about 5 GW, were listed as under construction. Russian nuclear stations supplied about 215.5 TWh in 2024. The domestic program is now entering a replacement phase in which older Soviet-era units are retiring while newer VVER designs take their place.
Russia Is Replacing Its Oldest Reactors Without Abandoning Nuclear Scale
The central task is not simply to add capacity. Russia must renew an aging fleet while keeping generation stable across a very large power system. Several units that entered service during the 1970s and 1980s remain operational, including reactors at Kola, Leningrad, Kursk, Smolensk and Novovoronezh. Modernization and life extensions have kept them producing, but the oldest units cannot remain online indefinitely.
Russia still operates seven RBMK graphite-moderated reactors at Kursk, Leningrad and Smolensk. The long-term direction, however, is toward pressurized-water VVER technology. At Leningrad, two VVER-1200 units operate alongside the remaining RBMK units. At Kursk, new VVER-TOI reactors are replacing retired RBMK capacity.
Kursk II Unit 1 reached the grid at the end of 2025. The VVER-TOI is an updated development of the VVER-1200 platform, designed for higher output and more standardized construction. Additional units are under construction at Kursk II and Leningrad II, allowing Russia to preserve nuclear generation in established power regions while renewing the underlying technology.
Russia has also stated an objective of increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to about 25% by 2045. Reaching that level would require new capacity beyond direct replacement, together with transmission investment and sustained demand from industry and cities.
Fast Reactors Give Russia a Distinctive Development Path
Russia’s most unusual nuclear capability is its fast-reactor program. The BN-600 and BN-800 sodium-cooled fast reactors at Beloyarsk are the only commercial-scale pair of their type operating within one national fleet. Their importance lies in both electricity production and Russia’s effort to close the nuclear fuel cycle.
Most commercial reactors use only a small part of the potential energy in natural uranium. Fast reactors can use recycled plutonium and other materials recovered from spent fuel while making better use of depleted uranium. Russia has moved the BN-800 toward a full core of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide, or MOX, fuel. This provides a practical platform for reducing demand for newly mined uranium and reusing material that would otherwise remain in storage.
The next step is BREST-OD-300, a 300 MW lead-cooled fast reactor under construction at Seversk. BREST is part of the Proryv, or Breakthrough, project, which combines the reactor with fuel fabrication and recycling facilities at the same site. The goal is to demonstrate a system in which used fuel can be processed and returned to the reactor.
The program remains technically ambitious and must still prove reliable and economic operation. Even so, it separates Russia from nuclear programs focused only on conventional large light-water reactors.
Nuclear Power Also Serves Remote Regions
Russia’s northern and eastern geography creates energy problems that large reactors cannot solve. Many settlements are isolated from the main grid, depend on expensive fuel deliveries and serve mining or industrial projects with concentrated power demand.
The Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear plant operates at Pevek in Chukotka with two KLT-40S reactor units, each providing about 32 MW net. The plant also supplies heat and, by early 2025, generated more than 60% of the electricity used in the Chaun-Bilibino energy hub. It partly replaces aging local generation and supports activity in a region where fuel transport is difficult.
Russia is also developing an onshore small nuclear plant based on the RITM-200N reactor for Yakutia. Related technology has been offered to Uzbekistan, turning domestic remote-power experience into an export product. Small reactors will not replace the VVER fleet, but they may serve isolated grids, mining districts and industrial sites if construction and maintenance costs remain manageable.
Rosatom Connects Domestic Power to an International Business
Russia’s nuclear sector is organized around Rosatom, the state corporation that brings together generation, engineering, uranium activities, enrichment, fuel production, research and overseas construction. This integrated structure allows Russia to offer other countries a package that may include reactor technology, financing, fuel, training, maintenance and long-term technical support.
Major Russian-backed projects include Akkuyu in Türkiye, El Dabaa in Egypt, Rooppur in Bangladesh and additional units at Kudankulam in India. Russia also works with China on reactor and fuel-cycle projects, while agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expanded its future pipeline.
This model creates relationships lasting for decades. A customer may continue buying fuel, components and engineering services long after construction ends. The export program therefore supports Russian manufacturing while creating durable links with national energy systems abroad.
International projects also carry financial and execution risk. Construction schedules, regulation, currencies and political relationships can affect delivery. Rosatom’s ability to combine state-backed finance with reactor supply nevertheless remains a strong advantage in emerging nuclear markets.
European Diversification Is Changing Russia’s Market
Russia’s nuclear trade has been harder to replace than its fossil-fuel trade because nuclear supply chains are specialized. Several European countries operate VVER reactors and have historically depended on Russian fuel designs, enrichment services or technical support.
That market is changing. The European Union has set a policy direction toward reducing Russian nuclear-energy dependencies, while VVER operators are qualifying alternative fuel from Western suppliers. The transition will take time because new fuel must be engineered, tested and licensed for specific reactors.
Russia therefore faces a more divided international market. Business in parts of Europe is likely to decline, while Asia, the Middle East and Africa may remain more open to Russian technology and financing. Rosatom’s position will increasingly depend on whether projects outside Europe proceed on schedule and whether customers accept long-term Russian fuel and service relationships.
Russia’s Nuclear Future Depends on Execution
Russia is managing reactor replacement, domestic expansion, fast-reactor development, small nuclear systems and international construction at the same time. Its existing fleet provides a large industrial base, while the VVER program offers a standardized route for replacing old capacity.
The next phase will be judged by delivery. New units must arrive quickly enough to replace retirements, BREST must demonstrate the value of a closed fuel cycle, and small reactors must prove suitable for remote regions. Internationally, Russia must maintain projects in markets that remain open while adapting to declining access in Europe. Nuclear power will remain central to the Russian electricity system, but its wider influence will depend on whether this broad portfolio can be completed reliably.
