Ukraine’s coal industry was already declining before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Aging mines, weak profitability, state subsidies, environmental costs and competition from nuclear power had created pressure for restructuring. The war transformed that gradual transition into a crisis involving occupied resources, destroyed power plants, disrupted logistics and threatened mining communities.
Coal still has an important role in Ukraine’s electricity and industrial systems. Thermal power plants can provide dispatchable generation, while coking coal supports steel production. However, much of the country’s coal resource is located in or near occupied and heavily contested territory. Several major power stations have been damaged or destroyed, and the future of coal is now tied directly to national security and postwar reconstruction.
Ukraine’s Largest Coal Resources Lie in the East
Ukraine held an estimated 38 billion short tons of coal reserves in 2023. Most are located in the Donbas-Donets Basin, which extends across the eastern part of the country. The basin contains bituminous coal, anthracite and metallurgical coal that historically supplied power stations, coke plants, steel mills and other heavy industries.
The Donbas was the center of Ukrainian coal production for more than a century. Cities and towns developed around underground mines, railways, power stations and metal-processing facilities. Coal was not simply an energy commodity; it shaped the industrial and social structure of eastern Ukraine.
The conflict that began in 2014 separated Ukraine from many mines in Donetsk and Luhansk. The full-scale invasion caused further losses through occupation, physical damage, flooding, electricity cuts and the breakdown of transport networks. Ukraine does not purchase coal from Russian-controlled parts of the Donbas, leaving a large share of the country’s geological resource outside its effective supply system.
Production fell from more than 72 million short tons in 2012 to approximately 18 million short tons in 2023. The decline reflects territorial loss as well as the long-term economic problems of deep underground mining. Ukraine still operates mines in areas under government control, but output is far below the level that once supported its coal-based industrial economy.
Coal Power Remains Valuable Because the Electricity System Is Damaged
Coal produced about 22 terawatt-hours of Ukrainian electricity in 2023, equal to roughly 21% of total generation. It was the country’s second-largest electricity source after nuclear power.
Under normal conditions, coal plants provide controllable generation that can respond to changes in demand. This role became more important after the invasion because Ukraine lost access to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and suffered repeated damage to hydropower, thermal generation, substations and transmission lines.
At the same time, coal-fired power stations became direct targets. Russian attacks damaged five of DTEK’s six thermal stations during the major 2024 campaign against the electricity system. The 1.8-gigawatt Trypilska thermal power plant near Kyiv was completely destroyed in April 2024, removing a major source of electricity for the central region. The plant was later partially rebuilt, but it was struck again in 2025.
The damage extends beyond individual power stations. Before 2022, Ukraine had approximately 38 gigawatts of available dispatchable generation. Occupation, destruction and damage reduced this to around 12 gigawatts after the concentrated attacks of spring 2024. Repairs restored part of the lost capacity, but each additional attack creates new equipment, financing and security requirements.
Coal plants can support the system only when mines, railway connections, transformers, generating units and transmission lines remain available at the same time. Wartime energy security therefore depends on the entire coal-to-electricity chain rather than the supply of fuel alone.
Pokrovsk Made Coal a Critical Issue for the Steel Industry
Steam coal used in power stations is only one part of Ukraine’s coal economy. Metallurgical, or coking, coal is required to make coke for blast-furnace steel production. This gives certain coal deposits strategic importance beyond electricity.
The Pokrovske coal operation near Pokrovsk in Donetsk Province became Ukraine’s principal domestic source of coking coal after the loss of other eastern mining areas. Its output supplied coke plants and steel producers that remained in operation under Ukrainian control.
Mining at Pokrovsk was suspended in January 2025 as Russian forces approached the area and the security situation deteriorated. The closure created a serious supply problem for Ukraine’s steel sector, which had begun to recover from the steep production decline that followed the invasion.
Steelmakers can respond by importing coking coal or finding alternative domestic blends, but both options increase costs and logistical complexity. Imported coal must enter through ports, railways or neighboring countries at a time when transport infrastructure is also under pressure.
The loss of Pokrovsk therefore has consequences beyond one mine. It weakens the connection between Ukrainian raw materials and domestic steel production. Steel remains an important export industry, and lower output would affect industrial employment, rail freight, foreign-currency earnings and demand across the wider mining and manufacturing supply chain.
Wartime Labor Shortages Add to the Mining Crisis
Coal mining requires experienced underground workers, maintenance teams, engineers and safety specialists. The war has reduced this workforce through military service, evacuation, displacement and the movement of families away from frontline regions.
DTEK reported that around 3,000 of its 20,000 mineworkers were serving in the armed forces by the end of 2023. Mining companies expanded recruitment among women and other workers who had not previously held many underground positions. These changes helped maintain production, but they could not fully solve the shortage of trained personnel.
State-owned mines face additional problems. Many were financially weak before the full-scale invasion and depended on government support. Wartime damage, electricity interruptions and limited capital investment make modernization even more difficult.
Mine closures also create long-term environmental responsibilities. Underground workings must be managed to control flooding, methane, polluted mine water and land instability. An abandoned mine can continue creating costs long after commercial production ends.
This means Ukraine cannot treat coal transition only as a decision about power generation. It also requires plans for mine safety, local employment, municipal finance, land restoration and new economic activity in regions that have depended on coal for generations.
The 2035 Coal Phase-Out Target Remains Official
Ukraine’s Energy Strategy toward 2050 confirms a target to phase out coal-fired power generation by 2035. The government reaffirmed this direction after the full-scale invasion and connected it with plans for a climate-neutral, decentralized and more resilient energy system.
The target now exists in a very different environment from the one in which it was first announced. Before the war, the main questions concerned plant retirement schedules, mine closures, renewable investment and support for coal communities. Ukraine must now address these issues while also replacing destroyed generation and protecting critical infrastructure.
A coal phase-out does not mean that damaged capacity can be removed immediately. Thermal generation may remain necessary during wartime and early reconstruction, especially when nuclear, hydroelectric or transmission assets are unavailable. However, rebuilding every damaged Soviet-era coal unit in its previous form would require large investments in assets that Ukraine officially plans to retire.
This creates a difficult investment choice. Short-term repairs may be essential for security, while major long-term reconstruction may be better directed toward distributed generation, renewable energy, storage, grid interconnection, flexible capacity and modern heating systems.
Reconstruction Will Decide Whether Coal Declines Gradually or Suddenly
Ukraine’s connection with the continental European electricity system has already changed its energy options. Imports from neighboring markets can support the grid during shortages, although cross-border capacity and internal transmission congestion limit how much electricity can reach deficit regions.
Postwar reconstruction is expected to emphasize decentralization because smaller and more widely distributed assets are harder to disable through a single attack. Solar power, wind, batteries, local combined heat and power units, stronger interconnections and protected substations can reduce dependence on a limited number of large generating stations.
Coal regions will still require targeted investment. Some mines may remain active for a transitional period, while others will need controlled closure and environmental management. Communities around mines and thermal plants will need replacement employers, retraining programs and new sources of local tax revenue.
Ukraine’s coal industry is therefore moving toward contraction, but not through a stable or orderly process. The sector is being reshaped by territorial occupation, battlefield conditions, damaged infrastructure and the loss of industrial customers. Coal may continue to provide emergency electricity and industrial fuel, yet its long-term position will be determined by reconstruction policy rather than by the size of the country’s underground reserves.
The central challenge is to maintain enough reliable capacity for wartime survival without locking future investment into a coal system that was already declining before the invasion. How Ukraine balances those two needs will define the final stage of its coal era.
